As a multi-ethnic, multi-religious developing country with a complex political system, Malaysia’s media landscape is a unique case study of how digital technologies have impacted its democratic process. Digital media emerged in the 1990s as part of the government’s initiative to develop new economic sectors by tapping into the information superhighway. While this has contributed to Malaysia’s digital industry, it has also influenced the country’s politics. During its nascent days, the opposition and civil society used digital media to break the state’s monopoly on traditional media and challenge the official narrative. Initially, the state viewed digital media with distrust, preferring to rely on its tried-and-tested traditional media, which is controlled. However, when it was clear that the public was relying more on digital media as a source of news, the state then realised that it had to jump onto the bandwagon. In fact, it started recruiting socio-political bloggers who eventually morphed into cybertroopers. To achieve political goals, they would deliberately deploy disinformation on social networking platforms to influence public opinion.  

In the book chapter State-sponsored disinformation through digital media in Malaysia, authors Pauline Pooi Yin Leong and Benjamin Yew Hoong Loh, explore the interplay between politics, digital technology, and state control in shaping public opinion and political outcomes in Malaysia. By using digital ethnographic observations of cybertrooper activity on various online sites and platforms where Malaysian politics are discussed, such as Facebook, Twitter, and local online forums, they analysed how state actors have utilised online media to manipulate public perception and political narratives. Socio-political bloggers were the first to create an impact on the political process just before the 2008 general election. Consisting of mostly ex-journalists or tech-savvy Malaysians, they were perceived as the Fifth Estate. After suffering electoral losses, the state started embracing digital technologies, discarding its prior abhorrence. Firstly, it started persuading socio-political bloggers, who were critical of the state, to switch their allegiance and adopt a more supportive stance, which subsequently led to their recruitment and transition into cybertrooper teams. With the emergence of social media as the dominant form of online communication, these digital platforms, with their reach and accessibility, became tools for spreading disinformation, especially during general elections.

Cybertroopers can be found on popular social media platforms such as Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter, as well as the comment sections of online news media and popular online forums such as Lowyat.net and Cari.com.my. Among the strategies used are sockpuppetry, which is the act of masquerading as a real user to express certain political beliefs, and digital astroturfing, which is about using multiple sockpuppet accounts to amplify engagement towards specific posts and narratives, giving the illusion of widespread public support. These cybertroopers were part of a cyber-army network often sponsored by the state to conduct “Black Ops”, “Cyberwar”, or “Propaganda” operations. In fact, the Washington-based Digital Forensic Research (DFR) lab of the Atlantic Council think tank discovered a huge rise in bot activity on Twitter (now X) just before the 2018 general election, with over 17,000 bots tweeting pro-government content and attacks on the opposition immediately after the election date was announced. Majority of these active bot accounts had Russian-sounding names with Cyrillic script, indicative of behind the-scenes campaigners; some 500 accounts were subsequently removed by Twitter (now X).

In August 2022, Meta, in its Quarterly Adversarial Threat Report, identified a series of active troll farms on social media platforms such as Facebook, TikTok, Twitter, and Instagram that were linked to the Malaysian Royal Police. The tech giant reviewed information from Clemson University researchers in the US and discovered evidence of a network engaging in “coordinated inauthentic behaviour”, an indication of cybertrooper activity which supported state initiatives through social media postings and paid advertisements, while attacking the opposition with claims of corruption.  

Another strategy that appeared recently was the emergence of social media influencers to promote certain politicians or political parties, especially during the 15th general election in November 2022, and the unprecedented influence of TikTok as a political tool for campaigning. Although TikTok does not allow political advertising, politicians and parties were still able to create their own short-form videos and engage social media influencers to promote their messages. Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party) ran a highly successful election campaign by relying on TikTok’s algorithm to distribute their targeted ideological messages of conservative Islam and Malay values to the heartlands, which enabled it to capture of 49 out of 222 seats (22.1%), the biggest gain in its history.  

This research clearly shows how the state has incorporated digital technologies into its disinformation operations, especially during general elections. The key to countering such effects is through digital media and political literacy education, which will create greater awareness among the populace about disinformation and therefore, neutralise its negative impact on society.  

Associate Professor Dr Pauline Leong
School of Arts
Email: [email protected]